Bates
Rating: 2
1) If
I were to perform a study where I examined how various people perceive the
concept of a chair, would my perception of the results fall under the
Information 2 definition since I’m assigning a pattern to other people’s
perception? Or would I need to develop an additional definition since I’m now
making a pattern of the patterns generated by others?
2) Isn’t
the phrase “given meaning” redundant in Bates’ definition of knowledge? The
definition is “Information given meaning and integrated with other contents of
understanding.” Bates explains that the word ‘Information’ here refers to her
definition of “Information 2,” which is “some pattern of organization of matter
and energy that has been given meaning by a living being.” So, an extended definition
of knowledge could be made by substituting in the definition of information 2
where the word ‘information’ occurs in the definition of knowledge. This
results in the following definition of knowledge: Some pattern of organization
of matter and energy that has been given meaning by a living being given
meaning and integrated with other contents of understanding. The second “given
meaning” seems redundant. Wouldn’t it make more sense for Bates’ definition of
knowledge to simply be “Information integrated with other contents of
understanding?”
3) Bates
says that information does not exist on its own plane of existence but in the
physical realm. Yet information is not matter or energy, it is the pattern of matter and/or energy.
Given this, how does Bates feel about information-as-thing? Would she classify
the pattern mentioned in her definition as an object or thing?
Buckland
Rating: 3
1) Buckland
says that words like ‘document’ and ‘documentation’ shouldn’t be limited to
refer only to texts but should be much broader in scope. What is the advantage
of broadening these terms in the fashion? If we were to have ‘document’ and ‘documentation’
be limited to texts, but add new vocabulary to refer to objects that perform similar
functions but have different compositions (like artifacts, or antelopes) would
the extra vocabulary be too cumbersome? Or would it allow us to easily qualify
and categorize information-giving objects?
2) Some
of the documentalists hold that in order to be classified as a document an
object must have a certain intent. It could be intended as evidence or intended
as communication but the intent must be there. How do these documentalists
determine intent? Is it the intent of the creator they have in mind? Or perhaps
the intent of the user? If I create a clay bowl with no intent of communication
or evidence – I just want a bowl – but 100 years later that bowl is in a museum,
is that a document? How about if I paint my history on the bowl intending to
communicate, but 100 years later nobody cares about my object and it is hidden
away in a closet somewhere – is that a document?
3) Buckland
touches lightly on the implications the word ‘document’ has on digital objects.
Which of the documentalists’ views would best translate to a digital environment?
What adaptations, if any, would need to be made to their definition of a
document in order for the transition to digital to function?
Harper et al.
Rating: 3
1) According
to Harper et al. when Microsoft was contemplating WinFS as a possible new OS
one of the reasons this didn’t happen was because legacy systems often had
little or no metadata. The authors go on to suggest that one of the big ways
forward is to rethink the role of metadata. What are some ways that
implementation of this concept – rethinking the role of metadata – could avoid
the same problem faced by WinFS?
2) They
end with phrases like “Much more needs to be done” and “Whatever future work
does need undertaking – and there is [sic]
obviously plenty of opportunities here.” Why don’t they elaborate on the
direction future research should take? I know this isn’t a lit review, but to
leave it by saying there is much to do but I can’t list any of it feels empty.
So I guess my question is: What else is there to do? How best can we proceed
with developing a new abstraction and a new grammar of action?
3) They
talk about the need for people to have the right to delete or own their digital
works, or to manage copies being made – and I agree. But should the creator of
a work be allowed to do anything they like with their work and not have any
consequences to their rights? If I build a sculpture in downtown Austin, then
later decide I want to “delete” my sculpture, should I be able to demand that
anyone who snapped a photo (create a copy) of it erase the picture? The creator of a work has the choice to post
that work on social media, and by making that choice they are electing to give
up certain rights tied to the work (most, if not all, social media sites
include language for this in their terms of use). What motivation does Facebook
have of saying “Sure, we’ll disseminate your content to the entire world for
you for free! You go ahead and keep all rights tied to that content.”? Would a
record label or book publisher make that kind of offer? No! So why should
social media be different?